Introduction
The creation of an autonomous permanent international criminal court, based on the principle of universal participation was widely regarded as one of the most significant achievements of the last decade. The Court had come into existence with a generous popular mandate from a large section of the international community, having received the requisite number of ratifications in a very short space of time. This support included prompt ratifications from African States, the largest single geographical grouping to ratify the Rome Statute.1 Ironically, it is the same region that has in the intervening period since the statute entered into force that has become some of the Court's sharpest critics. The United States had argued for but failed to secure special status for American service men, resulting in its very public opposition to the icc and it supporting framework.2 It maintained that the jurisdictional structure of the court, putatively, presented the risk of over-exposing American servicemen to politically motivated prosecutions. This opposition ironically served only to strengthen the Court's legitimacy in the eyes of the many states that saw it as the manifestation of a new order based on the equal application of the law. There was considerable amount of goodwill for what the Court stood for and for the implicit promise that it would serve the international community free from control by the political organs of the United Nations. Moreover, unlike Nuremberg and the un ad hoc tribunals that had primarily been visited on those defeated in war, the Rome Statute offered a real possibility of ending the culture of impunity, since it would operate as a general standing tribunal, applying the law on a regular basis, with capacity to try even sitting heads of states. The Court was also in theory shielded from political interference and crucially no institution or state was given a power of veto over its activities. The attempt by the United States to subject prosecutorial decisions to political control by the Security Council was decisively rejected by the preparatory conference.3 In exercising its discretion, on whether to bring a prosecution or not, the prosecutor was to be guided only by the existence of jurisdiction under the Statute and the gravity of the offences in question.4 A limited discretion to exclude prosecutions in those instances where the continuation was deemed not to be in the interest of justice was also tacitly provided for in the statute.5 Article 53(1)C empowers the prosecutor to consider whether having regard to the 'gravity of the crime and interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice' . It has been suggested that the provision was intended to empower the prosecutor in exceptional circumstances to take into account the existence of a political amnesty, the terms of which may have provided for immunity from prosecutions as part of a process of national reconciliation.6 As is now widely known, all the cases currently on the icc's docket are from Africa, these having been referred to the court either by the African states themselves, by the Security Council or by the prosecutor exercising his proprio motu powers as envisaged under the Statute -on the face of it a very regular application of the jurisdictional mandate under the statute.7 Five of the eight
